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Abstract: This paper investigates the link between variation in the supply of workers who participate 
in specific types of active labour market policies (ALMPs) and firm performance using a new 
exceptionally informative German employer-employee data base. For identification we exploit that 
German local employment agencies (LEAs) have a high degree of autonomy in determining their own 
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of the LEAs. Our results indicate that in general firms do not benefit from ALMPs and in some cases 
may even be harmed by certain programs, in particular by subsidized employment and longer training 
programs. These findings complement the negative assessment of the cost-effectiveness of ALMPs 
from the empirical literature on the effects for participants.  
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1. Introduction 
Does it matter for firms when different active labour policies (ALMPs) are used in the 
regions in which they typically hire their workers? So far, the vast literature on the effects of 
ALMPs, which emerged in the last decade, focuses on the question whether the unemployed 
benefit from participating in the programs. However, firms may benefit (or lose) as well: Bet-
ter-targeted applications from participants in job search assistance programs may reduce hir-
ing costs and improve match quality. Training programs may reduce the mismatch between 
the skills demanded by firms and the skills of the unemployed workers the firm may poten-
tially hire. Subsidized employment may directly reduce firms' wage costs and may lead to a 
competitive advantage over firms for which this program is not available. Thus, ALMPs may 
increase the profitability of firms via these channels. This may lead to positive long-run ef-
fects if firms prosper and create new jobs. If these positive effects materialize, they become 
part of the justification for the typically large expenditures on ALMPs on top of potential 
individual effects. From the point of view of the protagonists of those policies, such additional 
justification may be particularly called for, because much of the literature on the individual 
effects of ALMPs concludes that most of the programs do not increase the employment 
chances of their participants sufficiently to pass a cost-benefit test.1  
In light of the largely non-positive individual evidence, can we expect any effects on 
firms? We have three answers to this question. Firstly, given that most programs are rather 
short, the estimated individual effects for the unemployed will be small as well - in many 
cases too small to be detectable with the sample sizes usually available. Firms, however, may 
benefit from the cumulated effects in the pool of unemployed workers in which they hire, 
which could be much larger. Secondly, there is almost no reliable evidence on the effects of 
                                                     
1  See for example the meta analysis by Card, Kluve, and Weber (2010). 
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ALMPs on job match quality. The reason is a methodological problem: match quality can 
only be measured for unemployed eventually finding a job. This creates as selection problem 
into employment that is hard to solve even if program participation is randomized. Finally, 
there may be other effects the literature has neglected so far. Examples are so-called pre-pro-
gram or threat effects: Unemployed workers who expect negative utility from a program they 
have been assigned to may increase their job search efforts in order to avoid participation. 
This results in higher exit rates to employment but may come at the cost of reduced job match 
quality. Several recent studies show that such effects exist (e.g. Black, Smith, Berger, and 
Noel, 2003, Geerdsen, 2006, Geerdsen and Holm, 2007, Graversen and van Ours, 2008, 
Rosholm and Svarer, 2008, Van den Berg, Bergemann and Caliendo, 2009), but the effects on 
match quality remain unclear.  
In this paper we study the effects of the availability of different types and intensities of 
ALMPs in the regions in which the firms hire (called their 'hiring regions' from now on).2 
Such an analysis faces two main challenges: Firstly, informative data are needed measuring in 
which regions individual firms hire, how these regions differ with respect to the mix of 
ALMPs used, and how firms perform. Secondly, classical endogeneity and selectivity issues 
have to be resolved to allow for the intended ceteris paribus comparison of the outcomes of 
‘otherwise similar’ firms which exogenously face different regimes of ALMPs.  
The first problem is solved using a newly available German linked employer-em-
ployee data base that combines firm survey data with several administrative data sources. This 
data includes exceptionally detailed regional and program information. It allows for commu-
nity level measurements of hirings and of the composition of ALMPs. To solve the endogene-
ity problem between the respective policy and measures for firms' economic success, we ex-
                                                     
2  Thus, we do not directly investigate the effects of a firm ‘using’ for example a wage subsidy, i.e. the direct channel. 
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ploit three institutional features: Firstly, the local employment agencies (LEAs) have a high 
degree of autonomy in defining the mix of ALMPs they are implementing. Secondly, the 
LEAs' responsibility is strictly limited to the workforce living in the communities assigned to 
the LEA. Finally, firms' hiring regions do not perfectly overlap with the areas of responsibility 
of one or multiple LEAs. This induces exogenous variation in the level and mix of ALMPs 
firms face in their hiring regions. This variation is induced by preference-related variation in 
strategies across LEAs as well as by a substantial part of the LEAs' policy being determined 
outside the firm's hiring region. 
Although, there are several papers using regional information to analyse the effects of 
ALMPs on the unemployed,3 our intended contribution is – in that respect – most closely re-
lated to the small literature using aggregate regional data to gauge the macroeconomic impact 
of different ALMPs (e.g. Dahlberg and Forslund, 2005, for Sweden, and Hujer, Blien, 
Caliendo, and Zeiss, 2006, for Germany). However, a key difference to that literature, which 
also leads to different identification strategies, is that our target is the economic performance 
of individual firms, not of a particular region. Blasko and Pertold-Gebicka (2013), to our 
knowledge, is the only study that addresses a similar question as our paper using a somewhat 
similar set-up. In their observational study based on administrative data they exploit an in-
crease of job search assistance and monitoring in one Danish region to estimate firm effects 
based on a parametric difference-in-difference set-up. They do not find positive effects. 
Our results mainly support the pessimistic assessment of the cost-effectiveness of 
ALMPs. This assessment is consistent with the large empirical literature on the effects for 
participants for a wide range of programmes that are investigated here as well, as well as with 
                                                     
3  E.g. Blundell, Costa-Dias, Meghir, and van Reenen, 2002, who exploit the regional variation in the introduction of the 
New Deal for Young People in the UK, and Frölich and Lechner, 2010, who exploit an exogenous regional variation in 
the participation probabilities of ALMP in Switzerland. 
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the firm based results obtained by Blasko and Pertold-Gebicka (2013) for job search assis-
tance. Using a semiparametric econometric approach, we find that in general firms do not 
benefit from local ALMPs and in some cases may even be harmed by them. In particular, the 
extensive use of subsidized employment and long further vocational training programs in a 
firm's hiring region has on average negative effects on those firms. This complements the 
existing literature in an important way because the absence of positive effects on firm growth 
and survival makes it seem unlikely that positive effects on the macro level exist that are large 
enough to justify the huge expenditures on ALMPs. Our results are somewhat more optimistic 
for two specific types of training: intensive on-the-job training in a simulated work environ-
ment and training that awards a formal vocational degree. These programs are however small 
(but costly).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we discuss the 
potential links between different exposures to regional ALMPs and firm performance in some 
detail. Section 3 provides the institutional background on the implementation of different 
ALMPs. In Section 4 we describe the data, and discuss identification and estimation of the 
effects of interest. Section 5 contains the results and sensitivity checks. Section 6 concludes. 
An appendix contains supplementary material. Additional information relating to the technical 
implementation of the estimation and the data, as well as further results and sensitivity checks 
are relegated to an internet appendix.4 
2 How firms may benefit from active labour market programs 
In the empirical analysis below we will consider three broad categories of active la-
bour market programs, namely job search assistance, training and subsidized employment. 
                                                     
4  Currently, the internet appendix is available on request from the authors. Later on, it will be posted on the web. 
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Before describing in detail the specific programs and our empirical strategy, we review some 
theoretical arguments for a potential link between these programs and the performance of 
firms that could potentially hire their participants. 
Job search assistance programs aim at increasing jobseekers' search effectiveness by 
reducing information asymmetries regarding open vacancies, by achieving a better targeting 
of applications, and by improving job search skills. This program may affect firms may be 
affected by this program via two channels, both of which increase the firms' profitability: 
Firstly, firms save hiring costs because more effective job search of workers leads to faster 
hiring by firms. Secondly, the quality of the job match should be improved as well which in 
turn reduces turnover and thus turnover-over related costs, like a loss of firm specific human 
capital and future hiring costs.  
The objective of training programs is to improve workers' skills and thus remove or re-
duce skill mismatch in the labour market. By training the pool of applicants such that it is 
more suitable to the firms' requirements, job match quality improves. Moreover, firms save 
the cost of training new hires by themselves. 
Subsidized employment can have two opposing effects. Firms that hire workers for 
whom they receive the subsidy save wage cost. These savings improve profitability if the 
potential deficits in the productivity of the workers eligible for the subsidy were overcompen-
sated. In contrast, firms that do not receive such subsidies may be harmed because of a 
comparatively less competitive cost structure. However, if subsidized employment positively 
affects the employability of subsidized workers in the long run, other firms hiring from the 
same regional skill pool may also benefit from a more suitable pool of applicants (leading to 
similar effects as training).  
ALMPs may also affect firms through two other channels. On the one hand, participa-
tion in ALMPs can lead to sizeable lock-in effects, i.e. periods in which unemployed workers 
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search with lower intensity while participating in a program (see Wunsch and Lechner, 2008, 
Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch, 2011, for evidence for Germany). This may prolong the time 
until a vacancy is filled with a suitable match, and hence increase firms' hiring costs (or de-
crease match quality). On the other hand, there is a growing literature providing evidence for 
so-called pre-program or threat effects that occur after assignment to a program but before 
actual participation (e.g., Black, Smith, Berger, and Noel, 2003, Geerdsen, 2006, Geerdsen 
and Holm, 2007, Graversen and van Ours, 2008, Rosholm and Svarer, 2008, Van den Berg, 
Bergemann, and Caliendo, 2009): Unemployed workers who expect negative utility from a 
measure they have been assigned to may increase their job search efforts and reduce their 
reservation wage in order to avoid participation. This effect leads to vacancies being filled 
faster, but the quality of the job match may be lower.   
3 Institutional background  
3.1 Active labour market policies in Germany 2000-2004 
In this study, we analyze the effects of ALMPs between the two major reforms of Ger-
man labour market policy that occurred in 1998 and in 2005. Facing an average stock of about 
four million unemployed workers, the Federal Employment Agency (FEA) spent around 15 
billion EUR per year on ALMPs in that period (see Table 3.1). The FEA relied on five main 
groups of ALMPs. Table 3.1 displays expenditures and number of participants (entries) for 
these ALMPs for the period 2000-2004. 
Despite a steady increase in unemployment, expenditures on ALMPs have gradually 
been reduced over this period, leading to a substantial reduction of 3.5 billion EUR in 2004 
compared to 2000. The main reason is a shift from long intense and costly programs to more 
inexpensive ones. With more than one million participants in 2004 ‘training measures’ (TM) 
have become the most important measure in terms of the head count. Usually TM’s combine 
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weak forms of monitoring like availability checks with basic job search assistance such as 
teaching on how to locate relevant vacancies, on how to write a good application and on how 
to behave in a job interview. There are also programs that provide some job-relevant skills, 
like training for using computer software. Durations are 1-2 months on average and are lim-
ited to 3 months at maximum. Therefore, expenditures are low. Despite the large number of 
participants, they make up only 4% of the total budget. Another program that has gained im-
portance is the support of unemployed who want to become self-employed. Facing a persis-
tent labour demand deficit, the FEA increasingly encourages unemployed workers to set-up 
small businesses, mainly by providing income support to bridge the time until the business 
becomes profitable. Due to lack of data we do not consider this program. It is also of little 
relevance to firms with respect to their hiring opportunities. 
Table 3.1: Active labour market policies in Germany 2000-2004 
  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total budget in million EUR 16'131 15'636 15'346 13'796 12'531 
Share in % spent on: 
     
 
Training measures 2 2 3 4 4 
 
Further vocational training 42 45 44 36 29 
 
Employment programs 31 26 20 17 13 
 
Wage subsidies 7 9 11 14 11 
 
Support of self-employment 5 5 7 12 22 
Average number of unemployed 3'888'652 3'851'636 4'060'317 4'376'769 4'381'281 
Entries into: 
     
 
Training measures 476'672 565'132 877'038 1'070'137 1'189'599 
 
Further vocational training 551'534 449'622 456'301 246'245 186'624 
 
Employment programs 361'073 273'356 228'839 184'714 169'241 
 
Wage subsidies 204'948 192'555 225'732 203'824 192'174 
 
Support of self-employment 92'604 95'656 123'268 135'774 360'559 
Source:  http://www.pub.arbeitsagentur.de/hst/services/statistik/detail_2004/a.html, 30.01.2012. 
 ‘Further vocational training’ (FVT) is the most important program in Germany in 
terms of expenditures, although its role is diminishing. In the period we consider, expendi-
tures have been reduced by more than 45%, and the number of participants declined by about 
two thirds. This program provides intense job-related training. It aims to reduce the mismatch 
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between the skills of unemployed workers and what is demanded by the market. With dura-
tions of up to two years, these programs can be very costly. There is however substantial 
variation in both contents and durations. In the empirical analysis we therefore distinguish 
four different types of FVT:  The first group combines class-room and on-the job training. 
Here, we distinguish programs with planned durations of up to and above six months in order 
to account for differences in the amount of human capital added. We separately analyse the 
most intense form of FVT which provides a formal vocational degree equivalent to a German 
apprenticeship degree and takes 1-2 years to complete (so-called degree courses). Finally, we 
consider FVT conducted in so-called practice firms. They provide occupation-specific on-the-
job training by simulating either the commercial part of a company (administration, account-
ing, customer relations, etc.) or the manufacturing part.5 
The last group of programs considered is ‘subsidized employment’. It comprises two 
distinct subtypes. The first type is a time-limited wage subsidy which employers can receive 
when hiring unemployed workers for a regular job in order to compensate for the training 
investments required due to initial deficits in productivity. The use of these subsidies has been 
quite stable over the period 2000-2004. The second program type consists of so-called 
employment programs. They offer subsidized non-market jobs with the aim of both providing 
some additional income, and maintaining the employability of unemployed workers through 
daily routines, social contacts, on-the-job learning, etc. Durations are usually around one year 
and up to 100% of the remuneration the workers receive is subsidized. This makes these pro-
grams the second most expensive. They were mainly used in East Germany and over time 
                                                     
5  For the commercial part, practice firms trade virtual goods and services with each other to provide realistic conditions for 
participants, who are the practice firm’s employees. The skills so obtained correspond to what is required for the specific job 
held within the practice firm (e.g., that of an accountant). For the manufacturing part, courses in practice firms are heterogeneous 
and range from specialist training in technical professions to obtaining a driver’s license for special vehicles to simply practicing 
the craft of a carpenter. 
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their importance has declined substantially. This is reflected in the number of participants, 
which has more than halved from 2000 to 2004. 
3.2 Regional implementation of ALMPs 
To identify the effects of the supply of participants in different types of ALMPs on 
firms’ outcomes we exploit that in the period we consider (2001-2003) there is a variation in 
the use of ALMPs that is exogenous to firm performance. This variation stems from the fact 
that the hiring regions of firms do not coincide with the administrative regions for which the 
decisions on the local mix of ALMPs are made. In the following we describe this decision 
process based on Blien (1998), Mosley, Schütz, Schmid, and Müller (2003), Schütz and 
Mosley (2005), and Yankova (2010). 
In the second half of each year the Federal Employment Agency decides on the total 
budget available for ALMPs in the next calendar year. The FEA also defines some overall 
policy objectives and corresponding guidelines for the use of different types of ALMPs, e.g. 
whether the focus should be on qualification or subsidized employment. The FEA then de-
cides on which share of the total budget will be distributed to the 10 regional headquarters. 
This decision is based on the size of the region and local labour market conditions, in particu-
lar on employment growth, unemployment and long-term unemployment (≥ 1 year) rates, as 
well as the share of exits from unemployment. The regional headquarters then decide on the 
budget for each local employment agency (LEA) based on similar criteria. They also define 
overall policy objectives and targets for the coming year and issue guidelines for the use of 
ALMPs to reach these goals. In December, the budgets, policy objectives and general guide-
lines for the coming year are determined for each LEA. At the beginning of the following 
year, the LEAs decide on their individual strategies and on which share of their budget to 
spend on the different types of ALMPs. Since most services have to be purchased in advance 
from external providers, adjustments in the use of ALMPs only happen with some slack.  
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Within the overall guidelines issued by the FEA and the regional headquarters, each of 
the 176 LEAs decides autonomously on the use of different activation measures. The popula-
tion the LEA serves is limited to those unemployed workers who live in the area of their 
responsibility.  This is helpful for our identification strategy because due to clustering of 
households with similar socio-economic status in certain areas, neighbouring LEAs may dif-
fer substantially in their use of ALMPs due to the differences in their clientele (as well as their 
preferences). In Table 3.2, we provide exemplary evidence for this. The neighbouring cities of 
Berlin and Potsdam form one local labour market. It is served by 6 different LEAs. People 
living in this region can easily commute to any place within this area. Table 3.2 shows the 
share of unemployed workers participating in the four types of ALMPs for the period we will 
consider in the empirical analysis (2001-2003).  
Table 3.2: Regional variation in ALMPs for the Berlin/Potsdam labour market 2001-2003 
 Training measures Further vocational training Employment programs Wage subsidies 
 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 
Potsdam 1.8 1.5 2.8 8.2 7.5 4.6 5.7 5.1 4.6 3.6 5.3 4.7 
Berlin South 1.1 1.3 2.1 8.1 7.1 4.7 7.0 5.9 5.5 3.3 3.0 3.4 
Berlin South-West 0.7 1.2 1.7 7.3 6.8 5.2 6.0 6.1 5.2 3.3 4.3 3.8 
Berlin North 0.7 1.0 1.1 7.4 6.7 3.7 4.4 4.2 3.5 1.9 2.8 3.1 
Berlin Centre 1.1 0.8 1.7 8.1 6.0 4.2 7.2 5.1 4.6 2.1 2.0 1.6 
Berlin East 1.0 0.9 1.4 7.5 7.3 4.7 7.3 5.5 4.3 2.1 1.8 2.2 
Note: Participants as a fraction of the unemployed calculated as (average number of participants * 100) / (average num-
ber of participants + average number of unemployed). Source: Eingliederungsbilanzen published on 
http://www.pub.arbeitsagentur.de/hst/services/statistik/detail_2004/a.html, 30.01.2012. 
We find substantial variation in the use of different ALMPs. Consider, for example, 
the year 2003:  the share of unemployed participating in training measures is 1.5 times higher 
in Potsdam than in Berlin North. For wage subsidies, the share is 3 times higher in Potsdam 
than in Berlin Centre. Berlin South strongly focuses on the use of employment programs, 
while Berlin South-West emphasizes further vocational training. Since all 6 LEAs are serving 
the same labour market, this variation is induced by the different clientele each LEA serves 
and by LEA-specific strategies and preferences. Thus, conditional on the composition and 
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performance of the local labour market, this variation in the use of ALMPs can be regarded as 
exogenous to the performance of a firm operating in this labour market, as long as it does not 
employ a significant share of the local work force and thus influences indirectly (or directly) 
the decisions of the LEA. It is important to note at this point that - in contrast, for example, to 
the U.S. - private sector representatives are not involved in determining the strategy of the 
LEAs. In the next section, we describe in detail how we exploit this variation for the identifi-
cation of the effects of ALMP on the economic outcomes of the firms. 
4 Empirical strategy 
4.1 Basic idea for identification  
The identification strategy is based on the following intuition: Suppose that there are 
two firms. They are located in different communities. Therefore, they have different 'hiring 
regions' (i.e. the regions from which firms draw their work force; to be defined exactly be-
low). Suppose further that these firms are comparable in terms of their characteristics (size, 
age, industry, composition of employees, etc.) as well as the characteristics of the local labour 
market in which they are hiring (GDP, unemployment, industry structure, composition of 
workforce, etc.). We exploit the fact that despite their similarity and comparable labour mar-
ket conditions in their (potentially overlapping) hiring regions, both firms face different sup-
plies of participants in different types of ALMPs for reasons that are exogenous to the firms' 
performances. Exogeneity is coming from three sources which are all related to the fact that 
the firms' hiring regions do not perfectly coincide with the area of responsibility of a single 
LEA: Firstly, the workers living in the firms' hiring regions are served by different LEAs. 
This induces variation in ALMPs of the hiring regions due to differences in activation strate-
gies that are unrelated to local labour market conditions. These differences are for example 
related to the preferences of the LEA's directors, or originate from different regional cluster-
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ing of the type of clientele each LEA serves despite comparable composition of the workforce 
in both hiring regions (see Section 3.2). Secondly, a non-negligible fraction of the workers 
served by a single LEA lives outside a firms hiring regions. This implies that the LEA's policy 
is at least partially determined by factors outside a firm's hiring region. Thirdly, the firms' 
employees make up only a small part of the workforce served by the relevant LEAs. This im-
plies that a single firm should have a negligible impact on the LEAs' active labour market 
policy.  
4.2 Data  
The main data used in this study is a multi-source linked employer-employee dataset. 
It covers all establishments6 in non-seasonal sectors that have at least 100 employees on June 
30, 2000, and that participated in the IAB Establishment Panel (EP) in 2000. To limit the 
potential influence of a single firm we exclude firms with more than 2000 employees. In total, 
we observe 2979 establishments in our baseline year 2000. For each of those establishments 
there is yearly aggregate information about all employees (so-called IAB Establishment His-
tory Panel, EHP) for the period 1990-2008 which is constructed from the social insurance 
records of the employees. For each establishment there is information about the composition 
of its work force as of June 30, each year, in terms of gender, age, nationality, education and 
type of job, as well as measures of earnings, tenure, and turnover. Furthermore, for all 
employees of the sampled establishments the individual data from the IAB's Integrated 
Employment Histories (IEB) for the period 1990-2008 is available as well. This administra-
tive database combines the social insurance records for employed workers, the unemployment 
                                                     
6  We use the terms establishment and firms interchangeably in the following as the definition in the IAB Establishment 
Panel (EP) is, in fact, a mixture of the two. In this data, an establishment is defined as the union of all establishments of a 
firm in the same community and industry. Thus, an "establishment" in the EP can be a firm with a single or multiple 
establishments, or one or more establishments of a larger firm. Note that, because an establishment in the EP is defined 
based on a community, if the firm relocates to another community this is observed as closure of the establishment. 
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insurance records, the program participation register, and the jobseeker registers of the local 
employment agencies. Finally, this database is merged with the IAB Establishment Panel 
(EP), a large yearly representative panel of establishments in Germany that started in 1993 for 
West Germany and in 1996 for East Germany. It includes rich information about the 
characteristics, policies, and performance of the participating establishments. 
To characterize local labour markets we also use two further datasets. Firstly, from 
INKAR (2004) we merge to our data detailed county-level information on population density, 
rurality/urbanity, migration, commuting, public transport, infrastructure, economic perfor-
mance like GDP growth, and earnings. Secondly, we use the Integrated Employment Histories 
(IEB 1990-2008) containing a large representative sample of employed and unemployed Ger-
man workers. This dataset allows characterizing the local workforce of each community in a 
detailed way. In particular, since the IEB includes the administrative records from the LEAs, 
unemployment insurance and social insurance, in fact we observe the same information about 
the local workforce as the LEAs when they decide on the use of different ALMPs. This is 
crucial for identification, because it allows controlling for the characteristics of the local 
workforce that determine both local ALMPs and firm performance. 
The time frame used for the analysis is as follows: The baseline year for our analysis is 
2000, the year when firms are sampled. Data from this year as well as from earlier years is 
used to measure control variables and 'pre-treatment' outcomes. The 'treatments', i.e. the firms' 
exposure to different ALMPs, are measured for the period 2001-2003.7 Firm outcomes are 
measured from 2004 onwards. Available outcome variables are recorded in two different 
sources. Based on the EHP it is possible to measure firm survival, firm size and growth, ten-
ure, turnover, and temporary contracts annually for the period 2004-2008. Based on 
                                                     
7  Later years are not used because the decision process for the regional implementation of ALMPs changed in 2004. 
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administrative records, the reliability of the EHP is high and there are no attrition problems.8 
All other outcome variables are calculated from the EP survey.  Based on the 2004 survey we 
measure the firm's economic development over the last year, the current composition of the 
workforce and current hiring in the year 2004, as well as expected personnel problems in the 
following two years. The 2005 survey contains measurements of profitability and investments 
for the year 2004, as well as of the state of the firm's technical equipment. All information 
coming from the EP is self-assessed. Moreover, there is survey attrition. All 2979 firms in our 
sample answered the survey in 2000. For, respectively, 47% and 44% of them we observe the 
outcomes in the 2004 and 2005 surveys. This includes some item non-response, which is 
negligible, though (0-5%). Thus, attrition is substantial. However, in Section 5.2 we will pro-
vide evidence showing that survey non-response is unrelated to the ALMPs considered. 
4.3 Hiring regions and firm-specific exposure to different ALMPs 
As discussed in Section 4.1, the firm's hiring regions and how they overlap with the ar-
eas of responsibility of the LEAs play an important role in our identification strategy. In the 
following we describe how these regions are defined and how they are used to construct 
measures of the firm-specific supply of participants in different ALMPs. We exploit that the 
IEB contains information on both the community where a person works and the community 
where that person lives. Hence, it is known from which communities firms hire.  
What we would like to measure is the region from which a firm potentially hires by 
assigning a firm-specific weight to each community by dividing the number of potential hires 
of the firm from the community by the total number of potential hires by the firm. There are 
two ways to measure this with the data at hand. On the one hand, we could use pre-treatment 
                                                     
8  A record ends when a firm closes. However, since this event may be influenced by ALMPs, it is an interesting outcome in 
itself (and recorded as one of the outcome variables used in the estimation). 
15 
information about the workers a firm actually hired in the past (i.e. before 2001). However, 
the community information is only available from 1999 onwards which implies that we could 
only use information from 1999-2000 to construct the hiring regions based on the firm's actual 
hiring decisions. Because the number of employees per firm is not very large (minimum: 100, 
median: 245, 75th percentile: 499), and the time period that can be used is short, this proce-
dure yields a very imprecise measurement of the community weights. Moreover, the discrep-
ancy between actual and potential hiring regions could be quite large in this case. 
To get a more precise measurement of the community weights and to better capture 
potential hiring opportunities, the following approach is implemented: Consider a firm that is 
located in community i. We use the IEB data, which is representative for German employees 
for the period 1999-2008, to check where all employees who work in community i live. We 
construct a weight wij for each community j that is equal to the number of workers hired from 
community j by firms located in community i, divided by the total number of hires by firms 
located in community i. Consequently, all firms that are located in the same community i are 
supposed to have the same potential hiring region.9 The weights sum up to one for each firm 
and can be interpreted as the long-run likelihood of obtaining job applications from a particu-
lar community. Although there will be some measurement error, this approach better captures 
the idea of how far a worker is willing to commute to work.10 Note that from the individual 
perspective, sending applications to particular firms should not be influenced directly by the 
firms’ reaction to the local ALMP. Thus, in this sense the weights are exogenous. However, 
there might still be concerns regarding the way we define the hiring regions with respect to 
                                                     
9  It might be desirable to split all workers in a given community at least by, for example, industry. However, this again 
introduces a lot of imprecision which is why we decided not to implement it. 
10  Our approach does not capture relocation in order to start a new job. However, since this is much more common for high-
skilled jobs, and since we are interested in hiring from the pool of - on average low-skilled - unemployed workers, the 
resulting measurement error should be negligible. 
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the use of post-treatment periods (2004-2008) and potentially endogenous relocation of work-
ers. We address these issues in various sensitivity checks in Section 5.3. As a preview of those 
results, note that there is no reason to believe they play any important role. 
Since it is known which LEA each community belongs to, the above weights are used 
to measure firm-specific exposure to different ALMPs. Because ALMPs are only relevant for 
applications received from the pool of unemployed workers we modify the community 
weights to account for skill differences in the pool of employed and unemployed workers. 
First, we calculate the weights conditional on the education level of the employees, i.e. educa-
tion-specific community weights, wije. We distinguish three education levels: without voca-
tional degree, with vocational degree and with college or university degree. We then calculate 
the share of unemployed workers with the corresponding education level in community j: uje. 
The modified community weights are given by 3 1ij e ije jew w u== ∑ . They take into account that 
for example low-skilled workers are over-represented among the unemployed. So if commu-
nity j has a higher weight among low-skilled employees than overall, it is more relevant for 
hiring from the pool of unemployed workers. Hence, we will have ij ijw w> . 
Denote by sj the supply of participants in a certain type of ALMP in community j, and 
by J the total number of communities. The supply in a given community, sj, is measured by 
using the number of completed courses in the period 2001-2003, or - if there is large variation 
in durations - by the number of participants weighted by the share of time within the treatment 
period 2001-2003 which they spent in the respective programs (see Table 4.1 for which 
measurement concept is used for the particular treatment). To obtain program shares we di-
vide this number by the number of unemployed workers weighted by which share of the pe-
riod 2001-2003 they have been unemployed. Using program shares ensures that we measure 
the relative importance of a given type of program independent of the level of unemployment 
in a community. 
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To move from the community-specific shares, sj, to the firm-specific shares, id , the 
modified weights described above are applied: 1 , 1,..., .
J
i j ij jd w s i N== Σ = 
 
Unfortunately, the 
sample of 2979 firms is too small to exploit the total variation in id  to estimate dose-response 
relations (like in Imbens, 2000). Therefore, we split the firms into two groups with high expo-
sure to id  ( 1id =  if id a> ) and low exposure to id  ( 0id = , if ,id b a b≤ ≥ ). In total, we ana-
lyse the effect of high versus low exposure to 9 different types of ALMPs that are listed in 
Table 4.1 and have already been described in Section 3.1. As cut-offs for 1id =  we use 
Pr( ) 1/ 3id a> = and for 0id =  we use Pr( ) 1/ 3id b≤ = . Firms in the middle third of the 
distribution of id  are excluded from the analysis. We additionally contrast high exposure to 
long training (TR) and low exposure to short TR with the reverse combination. In this case, 
due to sample size requirements, we define high (low) exposure as firms above (below) the 
median of the distribution of id . 
Table 4.1: Treatments 
No. Acronym Description Measurement 
1 SE Subsidized employment Participants weighted by duration  
2 TM Training measures Number of completed courses 
3 Short FVT Classical further vocational training (FVT) with planned 
duration of up to 6 months 
Number of completed courses 
4 Long FVT Classical FVT with planned duration of more than 6 months Number of completed courses 
5 DC Degree course (FVT that awards a vocational degree) Participants weighted by duration 
6 PF FVT in practice firms Number of completed courses 
7 Short TR 2, 3 and 6 with planned duration of up to 6 months Number of completed courses 
8 Long TR 4, 5 and 6 with planned duration of more than 6 months Number of completed courses 
9 TR TM, FVT, DC, PF Number of completed courses 
10 Long/Short 7 vs. 8 Number of completed courses 
 
In Table A.1 in the Appendix, we describe the treatments considered in more detail. 
Here, we report separately for the firms coded as d=1 and d=0 in a given contrast the average 
program shares in the six distinct types of programs considered (treatments 1-6 in Table 4.1). 
This is informative about correlations in the use of different types of ALMPs and hence im-
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portant for the interpretation of the treatments. The main message from Table A.1 is that ex-
cept for some correlations with training measures (TM) and sometimes with subsidized 
employment (SE), the other dimensions of the ALMPs that are not used to define the respec-
tive treatment are very well balanced between treated and untreated firms. This means that the 
treatments we define have a relatively clear interpretation, because most of the other dimen-
sions of the ALMPs are implicitly held constant. Correlations can only be found in the follow-
ing cases: The use of TM is positively correlated with SE, short FVT, DC and PF but nega-
tively correlated with long FVT. The use of SE does not vary much but there is some negative 
correlation with short FVT and DC in the latter treatments but not in the SE treatment itself. 
Table 4.2 reports sample sizes and descriptive statistics for selected firm and regional 
characteristic by treatment status for each of the 11 treatments (for a full set of descriptive 
statistics see Internet Appendix I.3). Selectivity in terms of the composition of a firm's work-
force is very small. We only report the share of female but differences in terms of age, educa-
tion and type of shop are similarly small (see Internet Appendix I.3). With the exception of 
degree courses (DC) selectivity in terms of pre-treatment outcomes (firm size, turnover) and 
earnings is also generally small. Sometimes larger differences occur for firm size but espe-
cially the turnover measures are usually very similar for treated and untreated firms. For DC 
there are larger differences in firm size, tenure and earnings. Here, selectivity is also highest 
with respect to the unemployment rate in the firms' hiring regions which shows a 5 %-point 
lower rate for treated than for untreated firms. A similar difference can be observed for Short 
FVT. In contrast, the hiring regions of firms exposed to a high share of subsidized employ-
ment (SE) or training (TR) exhibit higher unemployment rates than those with a low expo-
sure. For the other treatments, the unemployment rates are quite similar. The differences in 
the characteristics of the employed and unemployed workforce in the firms' hiring regions are 
similar to those in the unemployment rates (see Internet Appendix I.3).  
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics by treatment and treatment status 
Treatment d N Employees Females Tenure Entries Exits Temp Earnings UE rate Rural City 
(1) SE* 0 593 444 .37 5.8 .16 .14 .06 2790 .13 .24 .12 
 1 612 405 .37 5.5 .19 .15 .08 2700 .17 .28 .25 
(2) TM 0 853 457 .38 6.3 .18 .16 .06 2640 .19 .24 .25 
 1 880 377 .40 6.2 .18 .16 .07 2520 .21 .36 .16 
(3) Short FVT 0 736 403 .39 6.2 .17 .17 .05 2490 .22 .27 .24 
 1 878 417 .40 6.4 .18 .16 .08 2640 .18 .34 .17 
(4) Long FVT* 0 591 410 .36 7.2 .15 .14 .06 2700 .15 .35 .07 
 1 609 490 .37 7.1 .17 .16 .06 2790 .16 .19 .20 
(5) DC 0 846 359 .41 5.9 .17 .17 .07 2460 .23 .35 .22 
 1 875 431 .39 6.6 .17 .16 .07 2670 .18 .30 .21 
(6) PF 0 854 408 .40 6.0 .18 .18 .07 2580 .21 .26 .33 
 1 880 378 .40 6.2 .18 .17 .08 2520 .20 .38 .18 
(7) Short TR 0 758 457 .38 6.3 .18 .17 .06 2640 .19 .21 .29 
 1 878 369 .41 6.2 .18 .16 .07 2520 .21 .36 .14 
(8) Long TR* 0 592 401 .37 7.0 .16 .14 .06 2730 .15 .30 .09 
 1 546 463 .38 7.1 .17 .16 .06 2760 .16 .19 .18 
(9) TR 0 793 456 .38 6.4 .17 .17 .06 2640 .18 .23 .27 
 1 878 371 .41 6.1 .18 .16 .07 2490 .22 .38 .14 
(10) Long/Short* 0 461 422 .37 7.1 .16 .16 .06 2730 .16 .26 .09 
 1 451 511 .38 6.8 .18 .17 .06 2850 .16 .12 .29 
Note: *Treatments 1, 4, 8 and 10 only include West German firms due to lack of common support for East German firms. 
SE subsidized employment (mainly wage subsidies), TM training measures, FVT further vocational training, DC de-
gree courses, PF practice firms, TR training. N = number of observations (establishments). All variables are meas-
ured in 2000 and calculated from the IEB or the EHP data. Tenure is measured in years, earnings in EUR per 
month. Females, entries, exits and temporary workers (Temp) are shares of employees. UE rate = number of 
unemployed workers / number of employed workers weighted by the spell duration in 2000 for each community and 
then aggregated using the firm-specific weights. Rural and City are community-specific dummies aggregated using 
the firm-specific weights. 
However, selectivity is strong for all treatments with respect to the (weighted) share of 
rural and urban communities in the firms' hiring regions. It is important to note though that 
the small differences in pre-treatment outcomes indicate that the link between those regional 
differences and firm performance seems to be weak. This supports our argument that the 
differences in the local use of ALMPs are to a large extent driven by factors that are unrelated 
to firm performance, especially since the differences in the composition of the local work-
force and labour market performance are also moderate to small.  
Another lesson from Table 4.2 is that the firms for which the effects are estimated dif-
fer for each treatment (both in their number and their characteristics). Thus, if effects are 
heterogeneous, the effects obtained below are not directly comparable across treatments. In 
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particular, for some treatments we only use West German firms (see note to Table 4.2). The 
reason is that the number of East German firms in one of the treatment groups is too small to 
allow capturing the relevant selectivity (lack of overlap in the covariate distributions, i.e. no 
common support). The full set of descriptive statistics in Internet Appendix I.3 shows how the 
firms considered in each treatment differ in detail. 
4.4 Plausibility of the identification strategy 
As discussed in Section 4.1, the basic idea for identification is that we condition on all 
variables that jointly determine the ALMPs conducted inside the firm's hiring regions and the 
firm's performance, and then exploit that there is still variation in these local ALMPs. This 
variation is induced by characteristics of areas outside the firm's hiring region which are 
administered by the same LEAs, and/or by overall differences in LEA strategies. This implies 
that we impose the following three specific assumptions: (1) All characteristics of the firm 
and the firm's hiring region that are related to both firm performance and community-specific 
ALMPs within the firm's hiring region are observed.11 (2) The firm's hiring region does not 
completely coincide with the area of responsibility of a single LEA. (3) The firms' employees 
are a negligible part of the workforce served by the relevant LEAs.12  
The plausibility of assumption (1) hinges on the ability to capture the relevant differ-
ences in the economic performance of the firms' hiring regions as they are related to both firm 
performance and local ALMPs. We argue that this is possible with our data. Firstly, we ob-
serve a rich set of indicators for and predictors of economic performance on the county level: 
GDP growth, jobs per inhabitant, earnings, population density, rurality/urbanity, migration, 
                                                     
11  We also need common support in all these characteristics. 
12  Implicitly, we also assume that firms do not strategically choose their location to maximize the benefits from local 
ALMPs. This is plausible since location choices are long-term because of the fixed cost involved, while autonomous local 
policy variations are only possible very recently. 
21 
commuting, public transport, travel time to next bigger city, and child care facilities. Second 
and most importantly, we observe the same administrative data for employed and unemployed 
workers that are available to the LEAs when making their decision on local ALMPs. This 
allows us to construct a large set of control variables that capture differences in the composi-
tion and evolution of both the employed and unemployed workforce of each community, in 
particular in terms of gender, age, nationality, education, occupation, industry, earnings and 
type of (last) job, unemployment rate, type and amount of income support during unemploy-
ment (see Internet Appendix I.3 for a full list of variables constructed from the different data 
sources).  
We also control for firm characteristics, in particular for industry and the composition 
of the work force in terms of gender, age, education, nationality, earnings, and the type of job. 
The reason is that the general economic performance of the hiring region may have different 
effects on firm performance depending on the characteristics of the firm, for example, if the 
sector of the firm differs from the sector that dominates in the hiring region. A priori it is not 
clear whether one should also condition on pre-treatment outcomes like firm size and turn-
over. For example firm size is strongly related to a firm's ability to cope with adverse eco-
nomic conditions and therefore to firm performance. Hence, it is an important confounder. 
However, if local ALMPs are correlated over time, pre-treatment outcomes may not be exoge-
nous to future treatments. In the previous section, we have shown that for some treatments 
there are sizeable differences in firm size for treated and control firms. We therefore condition 
on firm size in 2000 but not on other pre-treatment outcomes. In Section 5.3, we discuss the 
role of pre-treatment outcomes for selection correction in more detail. 
Table 4.3 documents the role of the firm's hiring region for the LEAs' decisions 
regarding the use of ALMPs (assumption 2) as well as the firm's impact on local ALMPs 
(assumption 3). In the first four columns, we report summary statistics on how many LEAs 
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overlap with a firm's hiring region. Only 36 firms or 1.2% of the sample overlap with only 
one LEA. More than 50% of the sample overlaps with at least 10 LEAs. Thus, local ALMPs 
inside the hiring regions are far from being dominated by the strategy of a single LEA.  
Table 4.3: Overlap of a firm's hiring region with different LEAs 
Number  
of LEAs* 
Number  
of firms 
Share in % Cumulative 
share in  
% 
Percentile Weight of hiring region 
in LEA region** 
Weight of firm 
in hiring region*** 
1 36 1.2 1.2 10 .04 .0004 
2 79 2.7 3.9 20 .06 .0007 
3 140 4.7 8.6 30 .08 .0010 
4 173 5.8 14.4 40 .10 .0012 
5 195 6.5 20.9 50 .14 .0016 
6 211 7.1 28.0 60 .20 .0021 
7 204 6.8 34.8 70 .28 .0029 
8 182 6.1 41.0 80 .40 .0042 
9 139 4.7 45.6 90 .74 .0066 
10 128 4.3 49.9 Mean .25 .0030 
>10 1492 50.1 50.1 Maximum .84 .0592 
Note: * Number of LEAs with which a firm's hiring region overlaps. ** Sum of employees in communities in a firm's 
hiring region divided by the sum of all employees covered by the corresponding LEAs, calculated for each 
community in a firm's hiring region and then aggregated using the firm-specific weights. *** Sum of employees 
in firm divided by sum of employees in hiring region. 
In column 6 of Table 4.3 we report summary statistics on how many employees live in 
communities inside the hiring region of a firm relative to all employees living in the area of 
responsibility of the LEAs that overlap with the hiring region. This provides a measure for 
how much of the ALMP of a LEA is determined inside rather than outside a firm's hiring re-
gion. For more than 80% of the firms this share is less than 50%. The mean is 25% and the 
maximum is 84%. Hence, there is no hiring region that completely coincides with a single 
LEA region. Furthermore, for the large majority of firms hiring regions do not dominate the 
workforce of the overlapping LEAs. Consequently, a large part of the LEAs' ALMPs is 
determined outside the hiring regions of the respective firm. For the small share of firms for 
whom the hiring region has a relative large weight we provide a sensitivity check in Section 
5.3, which is based on excluding these firms. The final column of Table 4.3 shows that all 
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firms have a negligible impact on local ALMPs, even inside their hiring regions. More than 
90% of all firms employ less than 1% of workers in their hiring region. 
Table 4.4: Determinants of the program shares in a firm’s hiring region 
   
Short Long 
  
Short   Long 
 
 
SE TM FVT FVT DC PF TR TR TR 
P-value of F-test for joint significance 
         Characteristics of firm 0.55 0.40 0.18 0.63 0.55 0.83 0.30 0.87 0.27 
Regional characteristics 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 
Characteristics of workforce inside hiring region 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.42 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Characteristics of workforce outside hiring region 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 
LEA shares 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Partial R-squared in % of total R-squared 
Characteristics of firm 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.7 1.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Regional characteristics 0.9 3.3 2.5 3.3 3.6 5.6 3.0 6.0 2.9 
Characteristics of workforce inside hiring region 1.3 8.9 8.7 8.1 14.0 10.0 8.0 9.3 8.4 
Characteristics of workforce outside hiring region 0.6 3.5 6.3 3.3 12.7 10.5 3.0 6.5 3.0 
LEA shares 2.3 36.1 44.2 14.6 42.9 27.1 34.3 25.3 35.2 
Total R-squared  0.87   0.54   0.35   0.43   0.21   0.38   0.57   0.34   0.56  
Note: SE subsidized employment, TM training measures, FVT further vocational training, DC degree courses, PF prac-
tice firms, TR training. Tests are based on the regressions presented in Table I.2 in Internet Appendix I.2. 
To further asses the type of variation we are exploiting, Table 4.4 summarizes infor-
mation about the determinants of the program shares we use to define treatments. Table 4.5 
shows how they are related to firm survival as one major outcome of interest. In Table 4.4, we 
report summary statistics from firm-level regressions of the respective program shares the 
firm faces, on, firstly, the variables we control for (firm characteristics, county-level regional 
characteristics, and the characteristics of the workforce inside the firm's hiring region), sec-
ondly, the characteristics of the workforce outside the firm's hiring region, and, thirdly, the 
shares of the LEAs in the firm's hiring region.13 The second set of variables measures which 
factors outside the firm's hiring region determine the ALMPs firms face. The LEA shares 
measure to what extent ALMPs are driven by LEA-specific factors such as preferences that 
cannot be explained by the composition of the LEA's workforce or other local labour market 
                                                     
13  We group the 176 LEAs into 90 groups by combining small neighbouring LEAs. 
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conditions. These two blocks of variables are informative about the exogenous variation we 
use for identification. We report the p-value of an F-test of the joint significance of these five 
blocks of variables to see whether they matter at all, as well as their partial R2 in % of the total 
R2 to assess their relative importance. Table 4.5 reports the same statistics for similar regres-
sions of an indicator for firm exit in the years 2004-2008 on the same blocks of variables. 
Table 4.5: Correlation of firm exit 2004-2008 with baseline covariates 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
P-value of F-test for joint significance  
    Characteristics of firm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Regional characteristics 0.32 0.47 0.17 0.04 0.06 
Characteristics of workforce inside hiring region 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 
Characteristics of workforce outside hiring region 0.58 0.89 0.57 0.54 0.65 
LEA shares 0.07 0.38 0.09 0.14 0.06 
Partial R-squared in % of total R-squared 
Characteristics of firm 46 52 47 45 48 
Regional characteristics 8 8 9 11 10 
Characteristics of workforce inside hiring region 15 13 14 13 11 
Characteristics of workforce outside hiring region 9 6 8 8 8 
LEA shares 14 12 17 19 17 
Total R-squared 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 
Note: Based on regressions of the outcome variable of interest (firm exit in a given year) on the same blocks of variables 
as the regressions on which Table 4.4 is based (see Table I.2 in Internet Appendix I.2). 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the importance of controlling for county-level regional 
characteristics as well as of controlling for the characteristics of the workforce inside the 
firm's hiring region. The reason is that both groups of variables are related to both the pro-
gram shares and firm performance. Firm characteristics have, as expected, an important im-
pact on firm performance but they do not seem to matter for local ALMPs. This supports our 
claim that individual firms do not affect policy. From Table 4.4 we furthermore see that there 
is substantial variation in local ALMPs induced by factors outside the firm's hiring region. 
These are in particular LEA-specific factors such as preferences that cannot be explained by 
the composition of the LEA's workforce or other local labour market conditions. Hence, 
conditioning on firm characteristics, county-level regional characteristics, and the characteris-
tics of the workforce inside the firm's hiring region, there is considerable variation left which 
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we can use for estimating the effects of interest. Table 4.5 finally indicates that the 
characteristics of the workforce outside the firm's hiring region are not significantly related to 
firm performance, which supports our claim that these factors are exogenous. For the LEA 
shares we find no or at most a weak relation. As regards the latter, note that in these auxiliary 
linear regressions the LEA shares might also pick up functional form misspecification in the 
regional characteristics and the characteristics of the LEA's workforce. In our semi-parametric 
estimator for the firm effects of ALMP we do not restrict the relation between control varia-
bles and outcomes, hence such spurious correlations will not be picked up. 
In summary, Tables 4.3-4.5 provide strong supporting evidence that both the firms and 
their hiring regions play no dominating role in determining the ALMPs of single LEAs. 
Moreover, they indicate that, conditional on the firm-performance-related determinants of 
local ALMPs inside the hiring regions, there is room for sufficient exogenous variation that is 
induced mainly by strategy differences due to overlap with multiple LEAs as well as by the 
workforce covered by the LEAs that lives outside the hiring region. 
4.5 Estimation 
Estimation is straightforward because we face a standard so-called binary treatment 
framework where we condition on a large number of observables. For implementing the latter, 
matching on the propensity score is a standard method because its semi-parametric nature 
leads to desirable robustness properties and allows for effect heterogeneity (for a recent sur-
vey see Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). We obtain the propensity scores for each treatment 
by estimating probit models using the respective treatment dummy as dependent variable and 
characteristics of the firms and their hiring regions discussed in the previous sections as con-
trol variables. See Internet Appendix I.4 for the exact specifications and results. The models 
have been tested extensively against misspecification in terms of omitted variables, non-
26 
normality and heteroscedasticity. The estimation results for the probits confirm the conclu-
sions drawn from the descriptive statistics in Section 4.3.  
In a recent extensive Monte Carlo study Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch (2013) find that 
one particular estimator that combines weighted radius matching with bias-adjustment regres-
sions performs particularly well. This estimator is used in this paper as well. Its details are 
provided in Internet Appendix I.1. For inference we use the (block-) bootstrap by inde-
pendently drawing firms (and all their employees) and then bootstrapping the t-statistic to 
obtain p-values (1999 replications). Again, all details are relegated to Internet Appendix I.1. 
5 Results  
In this section, we present the average effects of the ten different treatments defined in 
Section 4.3 on various firm outcomes for the firms under investigation. As discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2, outcomes are calculated from three different data sources and refer to different 
subsamples of firms which result from outcome-specific attrition rates.14  
5.1  Outcomes from administrative data 
In this section we present the main results. They are based on the outcomes measured 
in the administrative EHP data. This data source has the advantage that the information is 
available for all firms (no attrition) in the sample and has a high degree of reliability. Table 
5.1 shows the effects of c.p. moving a form from low to high exposure to different types of 
ALMPs on firm growth, firm survival and turnover. The effects on firm growth are measured 
both in absolute (effect on firm size) and relative terms (change in firm size relative to 2000). 
Firm survival is measured by a dummy variable that is equal to one if the establishment no 
                                                     
14  As discussed in Section 4.3, the firms for which the effects are estimated differ across treatments. Consequently, if there is 
effect heterogeneity, the effects are not directly comparable across data sources and time periods for which outcomes are 
measured, as well as across treatments. This has to be kept in mind when interpreting the results. 
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longer exists on June, 30, in the respective year. To measure turnover, we use different quan-
tiles of the firm’s tenure distribution as well as the share of temporary workers. For the sake 
of brevity, in Table 5.1 we focus on the short-run effects measured in 2004 and the longer-run 
effects of 2008. Results including the intermediate years as well are reported in Table I.5 in 
Internet Appendix I.5. They confirm the findings discussed below. 
Table 5.1: Short and long-run outcomes from the EHP for the full sample 
    
Short Long 
  
Short    Long 
 
Long vs.  
Outcome Year SE TM FVT FVT DC PF TR TR TR Short 
Firm size a 2004 -32.7 17.0 -9.9 -148.3 -9.5 14.5 14.2 -57.4 9.9 3.2 
 
2008 -53.4 29.3 -21.4 -196.3 -13.6 33.3 25.6 -96.1 1.9 -24.0 
Growth in levels b 2004 -17.2 -17.5 -3.3 -46.7 1.8 6.4 -1.3 7.5 -9.1 35.1 
  2008 -37.9 -5.2 -14.8 -94.7 -2.2 25.2 10.1 -31.3 -17.2 7.8 
Firm closure 2004 1.7 -1.1 2.1 0.6 2.0 0.5 0.8 0.1 -2.3 -1.7 
 % points*100 2008 4.6 0.0 2.4 5.1 5.9 -0.5 1.9 1.8 5.1 -1.8 
Share exits c 2004 0.0 1.8 -1.3 2.2 1.6 0.3 1.9 0.2 3.8 -1.5 
 
2008 2.2 -5.9 -1.3 6.6 2.6 -3.3 -1.6 0.8 0.5 7.1 
Share temporary 2004 -5.4 18.3 -3.7 19.8 15.7 -8.0 16.0 13.2 35.1 7.2 
 workers*100 d  2008 58.8 -59.4 0.5 40.2 15.0 -35.8 -11.7 -14.4 3.7 53.6 
Tenure in days: 2004 1.2 15.7 1.9 -86.6 19.2 2.1 44.0 -32.7 88.9 -164.7 
 25% quantile 2008 -71.0 32.7 20.5 -63.4 5.0 96.5 3.6 131.0 135.3 -63.4 
Tenure in days 2004 -36.9 -94.1 4.2 -209.3 146.0 117.3 46.3 -6.5 77.6 -275.4 
 median 2008 -68.7 -16.5 -1.1 -226.5 110.7 309.1 84.1 131.5 243.4 -144.4 
Tenure in days 2004 -192.6 -54.9 41.6 -347.8 164.1 -43.6 108.2 94.9 0.0 -602.3 
 75% quantile 2008 -83.6 -5.7 8.1 -352.4 169.9 276.0 89.3 147.8 159.9 -477.1 
Note:  SE subsidized employment, TM training measures, FVT further vocational training, DC degree courses, PF prac-
tice firms, TR training. a Number of employees. b Difference in number of employees relative to the year 2000. 
Number of exits in last year. d Workers not employed in firm on June, 30, of particular year but in year before and in 
year after. Italics indicate significance at the 10% level, bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level, and 
bold numbers in italics indicate significance at the 1% level. 
We find that firms facing a higher share of subsidized employment are hurt in the long 
run. They shrink, employ a higher share of temporary workers and go out of business with 
higher probability. It is important to note that subsidized employment for those firms mainly 
comprises wage subsidies. Due to a lack of common support this treatment only includes 
West German firms. The other type of subsidized employment, employment programs, is used 
very rarely in West Germany. The results suggest that subsidized workers do not seem to be a 
good match. This is in contrast to empirical studies of the effects of wage subsidies on subsi-
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dized employees that use matching methods (e.g. Sianesi, 2008; Bernhard, Gartner and 
Stephan, 2008). However, these studies have been criticised on methodological grounds by 
Schünemann, Lechner and Wunsch (2013), who, using a more credible identification strategy, 
find no positive effects of wage subsidies for subsidized employees. 
For short training programs, which provide job search assistance or moderate human 
capital improvements (training measures, short further vocational training, short training in 
practice firms), we do not find any effects on firm performance. Hence, neither is there evi-
dence for open vacancies being filled faster, nor for improvements in the quality of the pool of 
potential applicants and match quality. The former confirms the findings from the empirical 
literature on effects for participants (Card, Kluve and Weber, 2010). The latter complements 
this literature and supports its pessimistic assessment of the cost-effectiveness of these 
measures. 
Firms facing a large supply of participants in long further vocational training (FVT) 
are harmed in the longer run. The share of temporary workers and exits increases signifi-
cantly, and the firms are smaller and shrink faster. (There are also sizeable negative effects on 
tenure and firm survival but they are not statistically significant.) There are two possible 
explanations for this finding. On the one hand, intensive use of long FVT may affect the pool 
of applicants in an undesirable way from the firms' point of view. This may be an indication 
that LEAs may misjudge which skills are demanded by the market.15 On the other hand, the 
large share of these programs might be evidence for sizeable threat effects which negatively 
affect job match quality: unemployed workers have a strong incentive to accept any job offer 
to avoid being locked in such a long program that they might consider mainly as a leisure tax. 
                                                     
15  There is evidence for this for long training programs used in the 1990s in East Germany, see Lechner, Miquel, and 
Wunsch (2007). 
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Interestingly, we do not find such negative effects for all long training programs taken 
together (long FVT, degree courses and long training in practice firms) although long FVT 
dominates this combined treatment. As the characteristics of the firms and their hiring regions 
(see Section 4.3) as well as the shares of subsidized employment and short training (see Table 
A.1) are very similar to those for long FVT, the differences in the effects are likely to come 
from degree courses and practice firms. We do not find any significant effects of a high share 
of degree courses in the hiring region although tenure seems to increase somewhat. There is, 
however, some evidence for positive effects of practice firms. In the long run, median tenure 
increases by almost one year. There is also some indication of positive effects on growth and 
a reduction in the share of temporary workers, but these effects are not statistically significant.  
When all types of training are grouped together, i.e. we contrast more or less intensive 
use of training in general, we find some evidence for more exits in the short run but also a 
shift of the tenure distribution to the right in the longer run. The latter again seem to be driven 
by degree courses and long training in practice firms. This finding clearly stands against the 
overall time trend and training being used more intensely in regions with higher unemploy-
ment rate (see Table 4.2). Thus, there is some indication for a possible improvement in match 
quality due to intense training of unemployed workers in degree courses and practice firms.  
For the contrast of intense use of long training versus intense use of short training we 
find negative effects on tenure which seem to be driven by the negative effects of high expo-
sure to long FVT. This also shows in terms of a sizeable increase in exits and temporary 
workers but the effects are not significant, probably due to the relatively small number of 
observations. 
5.2  Outcomes from survey data 
In the years 2004 and 2005 we observe additional outcomes in the EP survey for, 
respectively, 47% and 44% of the firms who responded to the EP 2000 survey. In Section 5.3, 
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we show that survey non-response is unrelated to the treatments we defined after selection 
correction. However, the population for which we estimate the effects using survey outcomes 
may still differ from the one using the full sample. Thus, results may differ due to effect 
heterogeneity. In Tables I.3a and I.3b in the Internet Appendix I.3 we therefore present 
descriptive statistics for the full sample and the two subsamples for which we observe the 
outcomes in the EP survey 2004 and 2005, respectively. All characteristics are very similar 
across subsamples with two exceptions: survey response rates are somewhat lower for firms 
in big cities and notably higher for East German firms.  
To assess whether this heterogeneity affects results, we re-estimate the effects for the 
EHP outcomes in the two subsamples that responded to the EP survey 2004 and 2005, respec-
tively. The results are presented in Tables I.6 and I.7 in Internet Appendix I.5. Our findings 
are similar for subsidized employment, degree courses, practice firms, and the contrast long 
versus short training, although we sometimes lose precision, and hence significance, due to 
the smaller sample size. Different results are obtained for TM and short FVT, for which we 
find negative effects on firm survival and tenure (significant for short FVT in the 2005 sam-
ple). This also shows up in the effect for all short training programs, which are not significant, 
though. It also affects the results for all training programs taken together, for which we no 
longer find positive effects on tenure. For long training programs, the negative effects on long 
FVT now show up significantly for some outcomes. Unfortunately, sample sizes are too small 
to investigate this potential source of effect heterogeneity in more detail. 
In Table 5.2, we present short-run effects for the survey outcomes. (To avoid even 
higher attrition rates, we only use the 2004 and 2005 waves of the BP.) Moreover, all varia-
bles are self-assessed with the usual drawbacks of such information. We focus on outcome 
variables that provide information on firm performance which complement the ones from the 
administrative BHP data.  
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Table 5.2: Short-run outcomes from EP surveys 
   
Short Long 
  
Short    Long 
 
Long/  
Outcome SE TM FVT FVT DC PF TR TR TR Short 
Profitability in 2004 (EP 2005) (1 of 5 categories): 
           Very good -1.9 0.1 -0.3 0.8 0.3 0.9 -1.7 -2.8 0.4 2.0 
 Good -1.2 6.5 -2.1 2.7 -1.3 0.4 2.6 -5.6 -2.8 -1.9 
 Reasonable -11.9 -0.2 -3.3 0.3 2.1 -6.8 -8.2 8.0 -0.3 2.1 
 Sufficient 7.9 -3.9 5.1 -1.9 0.5 7.5 4.2 9.1 3.4 0.0 
 Insufficient 3.0 -3.6 0.5 -3.1 -1.9 -1.0 3.9 -1.3 1.4 2.3 
Investments in 2004 (EP 2005): 
          No investments (y/n) -6.2 5.7 7.7 -5.4 4.5 8.5 5.5 -3.5 2.7 5.4 
Technical equipment 2005 (EP 2005): 
           New 1.9 0.3 4.8 0.2 6.3 2.2 -0.9 2.6 2.1 -0.9 
 Relatively new -7.8 -1.4 -8.6 4.7 -15.0 -8.2 -6.8 1.5 -6.3 15.7 
 About average 7.8 2.4 2.4 -3.8 8.0 5.8 9.1 -3.1 5.9 -14.7 
 Somewhat outdated -1.8 -1.7 1.6 -0.4 0.6 0.4 -0.3 -0.7 -1.9 0.2 
Firm closure (EP 2004): 
          Partial closure in last year (y/n) 3.2 2.8 -2.2 -1.9 -1.6 2.0 1.6 -7.0 0.9 -0.9 
Planned relocation of production to Eastern Europe (y/n) 1.7 2.0 -8.9 3.5 -2.4 1.2 0.1 -2.0 0.4 -2.2 
Stability of employment 2004 (EP 2004): 
          Hired temporary workers in first half of 2004 (y/n) -9.5 9.6 -3.1 -0.9 -6.2 3.7 13.1 -4.4 11.7 -9.2 
Temporary workers (y/n) -3.1 -10.4 -0.3 2.7 7.2 2.7 -1.8 0.3 -0.3 -2.3 
Leased workers (y/n) 1.7 8.4 -3.4 -6.4 -3.9 2.5 14.0 -9.4 7.4 -8.4 
Number of interns/helps -0.6 0.7 0.7 0.2 -1.1 0.7 0.8 -0.4 0.8 -3.0 
Current hiring 2004 (EP 2004): 
          Currently hiring (y/n) 1.1 5.8 -7.9 -14.4 0.6 11.6 0.4 -10.6 13.1 -13.9 
Number of vacancies overall -0.1 0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 0.4 -1.2 
  for unskilled workers 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
  for skilled workers   -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 
  for unskilled clerks 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 
  for skilled clerks -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 
  for high-skilled clerks 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.5 
Expected personnel problems for 2005-2006 (EP 2004): 
          Too many employees (y/n) -1.0 -13.8 0.5 3.5 5.7 6.2 -5.6 6.0 -4.3 0.7 
Too few employees (y/n) -3.6 0.4 -0.7 -1.7 -1.3 1.4 1.6 -3.2 -4.3 0.3 
High turnover (y/n) 1.7 1.2 -1.9 1.4 -0.8 -1.2 1.9 -1.1 1.5 -1.8 
Shortage of young qualified workers (y/n) -7.0 -6.7 -7.8 1.2 9.9 0.1 -2.9 -3.1 -2.9 -3.6 
Skilled workers leave firm (y/n) 3.5 1.7 -4.4 1.7 -2.5 -3.4 5.0 2.6 7.3 -6.9 
Difficulties to hire skilled workers (y/n) -6.4 6.3 -5.9 -4.9 -1.4 3.8 1.7 -4.3 -0.9 -3.6 
High training needs (y/n) -0.1 6.4 0.5 -4.5 -3.7 -0.7 5.2 -1.5 7.6 1.6 
Note:  SE subsidized employment, TM training measures, FVT further vocational training, DC degree courses, PF prac-
tice firms, TR training. Effects for binary outcomes (y/n) and shares are in percentage points*100. Italics indicate 
significance at the 10% level, bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level, and bold numbers in italics 
indicate significance at the 1% level.  
Firstly, we report effects on self-assessed profitability (dummy variables for five 
categories from very good to insufficient) as a direct measure of firm performance. Secondly, 
as predictors of longer-run performance, we look at whether any investments have been made 
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and at the state of the technical equipment (dummy variables for four categories from ‘new’ to 
‘somewhat outdated’). Thirdly, we directly supplement the information on firm survival and 
turnover from the BHP. In the BHP, we only measure complete closure of an establishment 
that was part of the BP in 2000. However, the BP contains information on whether parts of 
the establishment have been closed, or whether a relocation of production to Eastern Europe is 
planned for the coming year. As regards turnover, the BP contains more detailed information 
on workers with temporary contracts. The administrative data does not contain information on 
the type of employment contracts. It is only observed whether workers return to the same firm 
after an interruption. In the BP, there is information whether worker on temporary contracts 
have recently been hired or are currently employed, whether leased workers are currently 
employed in the firm, and how many interns or helps are working in the firm. The third set of 
survey outcomes provides information on current hiring: whether the firm is hiring at all and 
how many vacancies there are by type of job (worker versus clerk) and skill level. The final 
set of variables concerns expected personnel problems for the coming two years such as 
shortage of skilled workers of high turnover. They may be a predictor of future firm 
performance. 
In line with the results from the administrative data, we find negative effects of high 
exposure to subsidized employment on self-assessed profitability in 2004. This is despite less 
treated than non-treated firms reporting shortage of young qualified workers and fewer treated 
firms without any investments. Yet, the more outdated state of treated firms' technical equip-
ment in 2005 suggests that total investments, which we do not observe, might have been re-
duced.16  
                                                     
16  The effect is relatively large but not significant in this relatively small sample. 
33 
For TM and short TR, we see an increase in partial firm closure in 2004, thus confirm-
ing the more pessimistic assessment in the responding subsample with a higher share of East 
German firms. For short TR we also see a higher share of firms hiring temporary workers and 
employing leased workers in 2004, more outdated equipment in 2005, and more firms facing 
the problem of skilled workers leaving the firm in 2005-2006. For short FVT, we find signifi-
cantly more treated firms without any investments and currently not hiring (in 2004). How-
ever, we also see a lower share of treated firms expecting a shortage of young qualified work-
ers or planning a relocation of production to Eastern Europe in 2005-2006. 
For firms facing a high share of participants in long FVT, we find negative effects on 
hiring in 2004, which is in line with negative long-run effects on growth and survival, based 
on the administrative outcomes. For degree courses, which seem to have some positive long-
run effects on tenure based on the EHP (see Table I.6 in Internet Appendix I.5), we see a 
higher share of exposed firms employing temporary workers but a lower number of interns 
and helps working in these firms. We also find more outdated equipment among treated firms. 
The results for practice firms are somewhat mixed. In line with the positive effects obtained 
from the administrative outcomes, we find positive effects on hiring in 2004. However, we 
also see a significantly higher share of firms not investing in 2004. For all long training pro-
grams taken together we confirm the more negative picture in the responding subsample with 
a higher share of East German firms. We find negative effects on self-assessed profitability 
and hiring in 2004. We also see a lower share of firms making use of leased workers who are 
usually the first to get laid off, and fewer vacancies for unskilled workers. 
For all training programs together, we find an increased hiring of temporary workers. 
When comparing high exposure to long training to high exposure to short training, we find 
negative effects on hiring, in particular of unskilled workers but also of higher-skilled clerks. 
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However, there is also some evidence for better technical equipment in firms that hire in re-
gions with intensive use of long training. 
In summary, the results for the survey outcomes are largely in line with those from the 
administrative data. Perhaps with the exception of practice firms and degree courses, we ob-
tain a rather pessimistic assessment of the potential benefits firms may have from a large sup-
ply of potential applicants that participated in different types of ALMPs.  
5.3  Sensitivity analysis 
In the sensitivity analysis we address several potential problems of the empirical de-
sign used: First, all estimates for the outcome variables coming from the EP surveys are based 
on smaller samples than for those outcome variables measured in the administrative data 
(EHP). Therefore, we estimate the effect of the different treatments on responding in the 
respective survey. The results are presented in Table I.8 in Internet Appendix I.6.1. The ef-
fects are small and none of them is statistically significant. 
Second, for the reasons detailed in Section 4.4, we do not condition on pre-treatment 
outcomes other than firm size. Therefore, we estimate the effects of the different policies 
(measured 2001-2003) on the EHP outcomes in 2000 to get an idea whether this might cause 
any problem. The results are presented in the lower part of Table I.8. Again, the effects are 
small and are not statistically significant. The exception is one single coefficient which is 
significant at the 10% level (long versus short training on 25% quantile of tenure). Thus, our 
matching procedure balances all pre-treatment outcomes well implying that this issue does not 
seem to be a concern either. In Tables I.9, I.10 and I.11 in Internet Appendix I.6.2, we further-
more show that our results are not sensitive to conditioning on firm size. Although there are 
some differences in the significance levels, magnitudes are similar and the conclusions are 
robust. 
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Although the pre-treatment outcomes are well-balanced, one may be worried that 
treated and untreated firms are facing different growth trends and that this is driving our re-
sults. We address this issue by including pre-treatment firm growth 1999-2000 as control 
variable in Table I.12 in Internet Appendix I.6.3. In many places precision declines but the 
negative results for subsidized employment and long FVT, as well as indications of positive 
effects on tenure for practice firms and training in general, are confirmed. 
Next, we assess an issue that is related to the credibility of our identification strategy. 
Identification requires that the ALMPs in a firm's hiring region are determined to a large ex-
tent by factors outside this region. Therefore, another sensitivity check is based on smaller 
samples in which firms are removed that have hiring regions that may have a larger impact on 
the local ALMPs. Specifically, we exclude firms that only overlap with one LEA, or whose 
hiring region has a weight of 50% or more in the overlapping LEA regions, or whose weight 
in its hiring region exceeds 1%. This reduces the sample by 702 firms (24%). The results for 
the EHP outcomes are presented in Table I.13 of Internet Appendix I.6.4. Although precision 
declines due to smaller sample sizes, our main findings are generally confirmed, or least not 
contradicted: Extensive use of subsidized employment and long FVT has negative effects on 
firm performance in the long-run, while for degree courses and practice firms there is evi-
dence for positive effects on tenure. However, in two cases we find somewhat different re-
sults: For TM there is also some (noisy) evidence for positive effects on tenure, but the effects 
for all training programs taken together vanish. Note however that the power of the last 
sensitivity check is limited by the considerable estimation noise in the smaller sample. 
The final two sensitivity checks are concerned with the measurement of firms’ hiring 
regions. The first one addresses potential relocation of workers before starting a new job. In 
the period we use to construct the hiring regions (1999-2008), 10.3% of unemployment-to-job 
transitions and 4.3% of job-to-job transitions involved relocation to a different community 
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(which may just be a neighbouring community to the previous one, though). Although these 
figures are quite low, we investigate whether it matters that we use the community where 
workers live once they have started a job for construction of the hiring regions. In Table I.14 
in Internet Appendix I.6.5, we present the results when we instead use the community where 
people lived before starting the current job. The negative effects of long versus short training 
on tenure become more pronounced and in some cases precision declines, but qualitatively the 
results are unchanged. Finally, Tables I.15 and I.16 in Internet Appendix I.6.6 show that using 
the outcome period 2004-2008 when constructing the community weights also does not drive 
our results. Both excluding this period and just using it does not change any conclusion. 
6 Conclusions 
We investigate whether firms benefit from ALMPs by exploiting unique linked em-
ployer-employee data together with institutional features of the implementation of ALMPs in 
Germany that induce exogenous variation in the level and mix of ALMPs firms' are faced 
with. Our results mainly support the pessimistic assessment of the cost-effectiveness of 
ALMPs from the empirical literature on the effects for individual participants of these pro-
grams. We do not find any effects of job search assistance and short training programs in gen-
eral. Moreover, extensive supply of subsidized employment, in particular in the form of wage 
subsidies, or long further vocational training programs, in a firm's hiring region has negative 
effects on firms. These are important findings because the absence of positive effects on firm 
growth and survival also speaks against positive effects on the macro level which may justify 
the large expenditures on ALMPs but are hard to estimate empirically. 
Our results are somewhat less pessimistic for two specific types of training: intensive 
on-the-job training in practice firms and training that leads to a formal vocational degree. We 
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find weak evidence that extensive use of these programs improves match quality and reduces 
turnover in the exposed firms.  
For future research it would be interesting to analyse the channels through which the 
negative effects we find come about. Understanding the channels is important from a policy 
perspective because they may call for very different strategies to counteract adverse effects on 
firms. For example, the negative effects for subsidized employment may be due to bad match-
ing or the result of firms using unsubsidized workers suffering from a less competitive cost 
structure. However, identifying and estimating channel-specific effects is a challenging task 
and requires better data than we currently have at our disposal. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Interactions between treatments 
Treatment d SE TM Short FVT Long FVT DC PF 
(1) SE* 0 .03 .54 .07 .07 .02 .03 
 1 .06 .71 .08 .07 .02 .04 
(2) TM 0 .06 .36 .06 .09 .02 .03 
 1 .08 .91 .08 .09 .02 .05 
(3) Short FVT 0 .08 .53 .03 .09 .02 .04 
 1 .06 .71 .11 .08 .02 .04 
(4) Long FVT* 0 .04 .60 .08 .04 .02 .04 
 1 .04 .51 .07 .11 .02 .03 
(5) DC 0 .09 .58 .07 .09 .01 .04 
 1 .06 .68 .08 .08 .03 .04 
(6) PF 0 .07 .51 .07 .10 .02 .01 
 1 .08 .72 .07 .08 .02 .07 
(7) Short TR 0 .06 .36 .05 .09 .02 .02 
 1 .08 .90 .09 .09 .02 .05 
(8) Long TR* 0 .04 .59 .08 .05 .02 .03 
 1 .04 .54 .07 .10 .03 .03 
(9) TR 0 .06 .37 .05 .08 .02 .02 
 1 .08 .90 .09 .10 .02 .05 
(10) Long/Short* 0 .04 .76 .09 .05 .02 .04 
 1 .04 .41 .06 .09 .03 .02 
Note: Shaded cells indicate the program shares that have been used to define the 
treatment dummies. *Treatments 1, 4, 8 and 10 only include West German 
firms. This is the reason for the lower shares of SE in these treatments. SE 
subsidized employment, TM training measures, FVT further vocational  training, 
DC degree courses, PF practice firms, TR training. 
